December 2006 | Page - 1
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A REVAMPED AND BRAND NEW ESM DELHI OFFICE

ESM, Delhi moved in to their spanking new office in Saket with much fanfare on 24th November, Friday. Capt. Andrew Cassels, Director of BP Maritime Services cut the ribbon and a cake to officially inaugurate the premise.

The evening was a celebration to remember for all those who attended a gala party at Welcom Hotel located opposite the office premise to commemorate the occasion. Apart from the distinguished guests from the shipping fraternity a large number of sailing staff joined the fun along with plenty of friends and well wishers –

some coming from abroad.

We will be including an online gallery of the event with the pictures as well as the excerpts of the speeches by Capt. Andrew Cassels and Mr. G. S. Sahni, Secretary (Coord. & P.G.) of the Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, also the former Director General of Shipping who had not only congratulated for the new office but also complimented ESM for the growth and the contribution to the Indian shipping.

Some of the photos have been included on pages 4 to 6 for your viewing pleasure.

JUST BECAUSE IT ISN'T LEAKING, DOESN'T MEAN IT IS RIGHT
*Note: This monthly safety moment is collected from various sources for educational purpose and is not an actual incident from the ESM fleet.

A cargo ship was on its regular passage from Nova Scotia to Europe. At about 0520 hrs on the sixth day of the passage, the duty engineer was woken by an unidentified engine room alarm. Soon after, the fire alarm also sounded.

On arrival at the control room, the duty engineer saw flames from the vicinity of the main engine through the engine room access door window. He alerted the bridge, raised a loud vocal alarm and stopped the main engine. Within 5 minutes of the alarm sounding, the chief engineer was on the scene, the crew were mustered and a fire-fighting team equipped with breathing apparatus was available.

The situation deteriorated, so the chief engineer decided to use the fixed CO2 fire-fighting system. The quick closing fuel valves, main sea suctions and remote stops for the ventilation fans and fuel pumps were operated. Within 10 minutes of the alarm sounding and confirming that the crew were accounted for, he released the CO2. The

master also broadcast a "Mayday" by VHF channel 16 and via satellite phone to the appropriate MRCC. After about 3 hours, a hotspot was discovered in an adjacent compartment. The chief engineer released a further charge of CO2 into the engine room from the supply allocated to the cargo holds. This left sufficient CO2 for one more full charge for the engine room.

The hotspot temperature continued to rise, so the chief engineer decided to wash down the engine room casing adjacent to the hotspot, internally, from above and the access door was then closed. The engine room remained sealed until a salvage tug arrived on scene 3 days later. Once the vessel was under tow, the engine room was ventilated and atmosphere tested with an O2 meter and confirmed safe before a full re-entry of the space was authorised.

The vessel sustained significant fire damage to the engine room equipment. There was also floodwater damage from the use of fire hoses and collapse of some pipework systems.



Subsequent investigation showed that the fire was caused by the loosening and displacement of a main engine fuel pump inlet pipe securing plate. This allowed the inlet pipe to become detached, spraying fuel at 5 bar and 100 deg C over the main engine, where it came into contact with the hot exhaust system and ignited.

The fuel pump had been changed 5 months earlier. During the investigation, it was noticed that a similar fitting on another fuel pump on the engine had also been incorrectly fitted - the securing plate had been reversed. This meant that the cap screws were only screwed into the fuel pump block by 21/2 turns, as opposed to 81/2 turns when correctly fitted. It is likely that the fitting which failed, was also incorrectly, and it vibrated loose, leading to the accident.
LESSONS LEARNT
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At least one of the main engine fuel pump inlet pipe securing plates was incorrectly fitted, leaving them in an unsafe condition. It is likely that the fitting that became loose, which then led to the fire, was also fitted incorrectly when fuel pump was last replaced. Mistakes do happen during maintenance, and if it is possible to fit an item incorrectly, eventually it will be. The problem here was that, although the incorrectly fitted fuel pump fittings were clearly visible, they had not been spotted either on completion of the pump change or in the subsequent days and months during normal watchkeeping. Regardless of how often you inspect a piece of machinery, try to remain inquisitive and alert to the possibility that it is not as it should be. It is especially important for chief engineers to closely examine all machinery, following maintenance.

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The master did not use DSC to broadcast the "Mayday", and this could have limited the awareness of others to the situation.
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The chief engineer's decision to open up the engine room casing and cool down internally, while understandable, was potentially dangerous and could have caused re-ignition. Although the crew in this case were well above the fire, it should always be borne in mind that exposure to CO2 could be fatal. The lesson is to avoid exposure until the atmosphere is proven to be safe.
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Always consider boundary cooling to reduce hotspots; this will also help the CO2 to extinguish fires by removing or reducing the heat.
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