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As our advance joiners have flown
to Korea at the time of writing this report to join MT Jo Rogn, we
have embarked on a new relationship with JO Tankers AS, Norway as
their first ever third party ship manager.
It is indeed a great honour to be
able to offer our services to the world’s third largest chemical
tanker owner .We are very confident that the trust bestowed upon us,which obviously followed a long and arduous selection process
involving the leading ship managers of the world will be upheld by ESM
by all means.
This also indicates our reputation
in the world's chemical tanker market as one of the top professional
and competent ship managers. All our ships have maintained an
impeccable record with the oil majors; Port state authorities,USCG
and all other relevant maritime authorities.
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A bulk carrier, loaded with various grades of scrap cargo, was at sea when the Ballast tank gauging unit was reported to be malfunctioning. Location of this unit was in the stool space and access was through manholes in the cargo holds.
The subject of man entry into the stool spaces was discussed with the Bosun a day before. The next morning, the manholes for stool spaces in No. 1, No. 2 & No. 3 holds were opened. Thereafter, the crew proceeded to open the manhole
in stool space in No. 4 hold. At this time, the Chief Officer & Chief Engineer came on deck and apparently entered the No. 3 hold. Not long thereafter, Electrician, who was also called by the Chief Officer to come to No. 3 hatch for inspecting/repairing the Ballast tank gauging system, came on deck.
However, he was not able to find either the Chief Officer or the Chief Engineer and out of curiosity, he peeped into the forward booby hatch of No. 3 hold and observed that the Chief Officer & Chief Engineer both were lying at the first platform.
An alarm was raised and subsequently, the bodies of both Chief Officer & Chief Engineer were brought out on the deck. Attempts were made to revive the Officers using Oxygen resuscitator and
CPR failed.
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What
went wrong:
Although rescue was initiated immediately, the initial rescue methods used were not in compliance with safety procedures and caused two failed attempts resulting in invaluable delay.It appears that there were toxic gases present in the hold and that the cargo might have generated the same. Instructions given by the Charterers at each load port warning against an Oxygen deficient atmosphere in the holds and forbidding entry were not heeded.
Although, the cargo of scrap as declared by the Shipper was not classified under
IMDG, the BC Code, however, does mention "dangerous depletion of Oxygen in the cargo spaces" under UN No.2793 - Steel
Swarf.
Lessons learned :
1. Enclosed space entry procedures are mandatory as per ISM Code requirements and these are to be strictly followed by all including Senior Officers. Any faulty assumptions in this regard can be fatal.
2. During rescue from enclosed spaces drills the issue of rescue through narrow openings including availability of lifting equipment/ gear, its practicality and associated periodical drills should be addressed.
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